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THE COSTS OF CHANGING OUR MINDS
Nita A. Farahany*
ABSTRACT
The neuroscience revolution poses profound challenges to the doctrine of
avoidable consequences in tort law and exposes deep theoretical riddles about
the right to our own mental experiences and memories. To address this profound
question, this Article begins with a deceptively simple principle of tort law: A
victim of tortious wrongdoing by another is held responsible for mitigating her
own physical injuries. This Article addresses whether that same doctrine should
require a tort victim to likewise mitigate her emotional injuries. The answer to
that question is of great and increasing importance because it goes to the heart
of how society should address dramatic advances in neuroscience that enable
us to change our own minds. This Article proposes a revolutionary way to
understand both the answer to this question and to bring daylight to many
puzzling doctrines in law—through the right to cognitive liberty. Through an
introduction to the groundbreaking concept of cognitive liberty, the confusion
plaguing the doctrine of avoidable consequences in tort law for emotional
distress injuries is solved and new insights are developed with respect to other
doctrines in law. These implications are as far-ranging as the deliberative
privilege afforded to judges to the forced competency of prisoners. It quickly
becomes apparent that cognitive liberty is the interest upon which many of our
most cherished freedoms are secured.
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INTRODUCTION
Rape kits do not yet include propranolol, but they soon may. Propranolol, a
beta-blocker drug developed in the 1960s as a treatment for high blood pressure,
could blunt or even altogether extinguish the fear and emotional memory of a
recent rape.1 When the victim presents in the emergency room just hours after
her assault, her physician cannot then predict if she will become one of the onethird of rape victims who will develop post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). If
she does develop PTSD, then even years later the smallest trigger—a sound, the
refrain of a song, a smell—could recall for her in full force the anguish of her
attack, as if it were yesterday. While the physician cannot initially predict the
victim’s likelihood of future psychological trauma, he can know that her
memories of the attack, just like all newly formed memories, are extremely
fragile2—so fragile that if the physician could somehow help her alter her brain
activity then and there, she might never form the long-term fear memory
associated with her assault.3
Propranolol may offer precisely that. If the physician administers
propranolol to her in those early hours after her assault, her memory of that
horrific experience may soon fade, so that she might come to observe that
terrible day as just another day long passed. This may sound like a medical
miracle—and it very well may be—but with those prospects, would anyone
reasonably refuse the drug? The answer to that question brings daylight to an
increasingly critical issue in society—the role of cognitive liberty in our law and
lives.
Surely, if the drug is safe, then a rape victim should have the choice to lessen
the lasting psychological trauma of her assault. But how should the legal system
regard a decision by her to decline the drug? Had she been stabbed during a
robbery instead of raped, we would consider it perverse for her to refuse
reasonable medical treatment of her wounds. And in a tort suit against the
robber, a judge or jury would limit her physical damages because of her failure
to mitigate her own injuries. Is her refusal to take propranolol analogous? Or is
there some societal and individual value to remembering her attack more
clearly? Could blunting her suffering have the paradoxical effect of diminishing
societal outrage to, and condemnation of, rape? Could altering her memory
1

Cassandra Willyard, Remembered for Forgetting, 18 NATURE 482, 483 (2012).
Cristina M. Alberini, Long-term Memories: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 2010 CEREBRUM 1, 3.
3
Id. at 4 (“[M]emory consolidation requires the activation of molecular and cellular pathways, including
those involved in stress, cell survival, cell-to-cell communication, and the release of several neurotransmitters
(chemicals released in the brain to transmit signals across cells).”).
2
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render her an ineffective witness in the prosecution of the crime? Perhaps the
police could take her statement the moment before she ingests propranolol. But
would the use of her statement, which she has later partially forgotten, violate
the alleged perpetrator’s constitutional right to confront witnesses against him?
Moreover, would she be better off remembering and then transcending her
assault? How would memory modification impact her sense of self and her
identity? Writers, public figures, artists, and others speak openly about how
overcoming a pivotal adversity in their lives has enabled them to reach a new
consciousness, gain new insight, or achieve new courage. Do these stories of
transcendence impact how the law should consider her refusal?
This Article begins with a deceptively simple principle of tort law: A victim
of tortious wrongdoing by another is held responsible for mitigating her own
physical injuries. This Article then addresses whether that same doctrine should
require a tort victim to likewise mitigate her emotional injuries. The answer to
that question is of great and increasing importance because it goes to the heart
of how society should address the dramatic advances in neuroscience that enable
us to change our own minds.
Already, new discoveries in neuroscience enable us to selectively remember
or forget past experiences by erasing parts of, or even entire memories from, our
brains. With the advent of selective forgetting, rape victims, car accident
victims, burn victims, and others may soon have to choose whether to numb their
memories or have their civil damages reduced for failing to mitigate their own
suffering. This prospect poses a deep puzzle that tort law and theory are illequipped to solve. Courts and commentators have almost entirely ignored the
increasingly crucial issue of whether the doctrine of avoidable consequences
should require a civil plaintiff to mitigate her own pain and suffering. This
doctrine requires that an individual injured by the tortious acts of another
exercise ordinary care under the circumstances to prevent the aggravation of her
injuries.4 Courts and commentators all agree that a plaintiff must take reasonable
steps to mitigate her ordinary physical injuries. But they remain utterly
perplexed about whether or to what extent a plaintiff must similarly mitigate her
pain and suffering.
Pain and suffering are the “invisible” injuries—the fright, anxiety, shock,
humiliation, indignity, terror, or loss of enjoyment of life—that a tort victim
endures because of the civil wrongdoing of another.5 While no sum of money
4
Lawrence J. Ackerman, The Doctrine of Avoidable Consequences in Disability Insurance, 4 U.
NEWARK L. REV. 8, 9–10 (1938).
5
See, e.g., Capelouto v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 500 P.2d 880, 883 (Cal. 1972) (describing pain and
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can ever restore the peace of mind disturbed by assault, these compensatory
damages “give to the injured person some pecuniary return for what he has
suffered or is likely to suffer.”6 These damages also reflect societal “disapproval
of the harm caused by the tortfeasor,” and “promote loss avoidance goals by
sending a fuller deterrent signal.”7
Some important scholarship has already articulated the role of agency in
limiting the availability of emotional damages in tort law.8 But pharmacological
advances like propranolol that mitigate invisible injuries by literally changing
one’s brain pose a theoretical riddle that pushes the issue several layers deeper.
Only a few articles have addressed this issue at all, and none have attempted to
locate it within its broader scientific, philosophical, and ethical context.
Judges, likewise, have not yet squarely addressed this issue. Those few
courts that have considered what measures, if any, a plaintiff must take to
mitigate her own emotional pain and suffering express deep ambivalence about
the issue.9 Several courts have found a duty to mitigate emotional distress
damages, but none have quite explained what that duty entails or how it might
be breached.10 Other courts have intuited that something more is at stake in these
cases—and have invoked concepts like self-determination and autonomy to
conclude that the doctrine of avoidable consequences may not apply to pain and
suffering.11
The time has come for a systematic and thoroughgoing inquiry into the issue.
Modern neuroscience and medicine have heralded stunning advances in our
ability to understand and change the subconscious and conscious human
experience—with meditation, psychotherapy, electrical stimulation, drugs, and
more. Yet we have made almost no progress on deciding whether our legal
regimes will encourage, or even oblige, individuals to alter their brains in such

suffering as encompassing “fright, nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, mortification, shock, humiliation,
indignity, embarrassment, apprehension, terror or ordeal”).
6
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see also McDougald v. Garber,
536 N.E.2d 372, 374–75 (N.Y. 1989) (“[R]ecovery for noneconomic losses such as pain and suffering and loss
of enjoyment of life rest on ‘the legal fiction that money damages can compensate for a victim’s injury’ . . . We
accept this fiction, knowing that although money will neither ease the pain nor restore the victim’s abilities, this
device is as close as the law can come in its effort to right the wrong.”).
7
Lars Noah, Comfortably Numb: Medicalizing (and Mitigating) Pain-and-Suffering Damages, 42 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 431, 440 (2009).
8
John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 1625, 1685–86 (2002).
9
See infra Part II.
10
See infra Part II.
11
See infra Part III.
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ways, lest they be deemed to have wrongfully failed to lessen their own
suffering.
The answer to this question bears on far more than just a legal rule governing
the apportionment of damages in civil suits. It implicates an interest that is
distinct from liberty in the ordinary sense, an interest that is only dimly
recognized in the cases and the scholarship, and an interest that is increasingly
implicated by dramatic advances in modern science. This is an interest in
cognitive liberty.
This value appears (although obliquely) throughout many modern legal
debates. Consider, for example, the doctrine of absolute judicial deliberative
privilege, which protects the deliberative process a judge uses in decisionmaking from discovery by others. What is the source of this common-law
tradition, and can it survive developments in modern neuroscience? What about
forcibly medicating prisoners who lack competency to stand trial? Are there
contexts in which their cognitive liberty trumps societal interests in bringing
those individuals to justice? And what if the victim of a sexual assault provides
a statement to the police and then dampens her memory? Can her statement be
used in a criminal case, and should we reexamine what this means for a
defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause of the U.S. Constitution?
Although this Article focuses on the legal obligations concerning mitigation
of emotional pain and suffering in tort, it does so as a critical foray into this
much wider theoretical issue—the role of cognitive liberty in our legal system
and in our society. Part I puts the concern in context, explaining the
extraordinary advances in modern medicine and neuroscience that enable us to
quite literally change our minds, and therefore ourselves. Part II explains the
normative underpinnings of the doctrine of avoidable consequences, and how it
has been applied to emotional distress injuries in tort law. It illustrates how
judges have intuited but not yet articulated that a different interest is at stake, the
interest in cognitive liberty. Part III discusses the broader concept of cognitive
liberty, and when and how courts should apply it to limit the applicability of the
doctrine of avoidable consequences to emotional pain and suffering. It proposes
a two-tiered approach to doing this: deeming treatments that clearly impact selfidentity as per se reasonable for a plaintiff to forgo, and submitting to the jury
other treatments for emotional distress that may not be identity-changing.
Finally, this Part posits that our understanding of cognitive liberty may bring
daylight to many other puzzling doctrines in law.
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CHANGING YOUR MIND

A. Memories Can Be Changed
Do you remember where you were on September 11, 2001? Can you recall
in vivid detail the events of that day, the emotions you experienced, the people
you were with, whom you first called? Millions remember the excruciating
details of 9/11 even more strongly than they can remember what they ate for
breakfast this morning or where they parked their car. This is because traumatic
memories tend to be the strongest memories.12 The emotional content of a
memory enhances the strength with which the memory is stored in the brain, and
the degree to which it can be modified by intervention.13 Because they are so
strongly encoded, traumatic memories often haunt the victim weeks, months, or
even years after the event, leading to secondary effects such as anxiety, stress,
and sometimes post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).14
Memories do not immediately become permanent upon experiencing events
in the world.15 The common wisdom held by scientists just a few decades ago
was that our adult brains are static, fixed, and immutable.16 By the 1970s, new
research dramatically changed our understanding of the human brain. We now
understand that the brain is plastic and changeable, and that the memories stored
therein are changeable as well.
Newly formed memories remain particularly fragile and changeable as they
are initially being stored in the brain.17 The hippocampus in the brain, like the
random-access-memory (RAM) of a computer, processes and temporarily stores
a new memory for a short time before that memory is transferred and
12
Dean G. Kilpatrick et al., Rape-Related PTSD: Issues and Interventions, 24 PSYCHIATRIC TIMES 50,
53 (2007) (describing how the emotional charge of traumatic events causes the body to release stress hormones
such as adrenaline or epinephrine, which may enhance memory consolidation and the strength of the memory
itself). Because of the mechanism by which such memories are stored and the strength of their consolidation,
pharmacological interventions that block the effect of stress hormones such as beta-adrenergic antagonists like
propranolol may reduce the strength or stability of these memories. Id.
13
Alberini, supra note 2, at 6.
14
Id. at 7 (“Recent studies report that 8 percent of Americans suffer from PTSD and about 15 percent of
veterans experience multiple or all PTSD symptoms at some point after returning from combat. Available
therapies rarely exceed 60 percent success rates, and no more than 20 to 30 percent of patients achieve full
remission.”).
15
Yutaka Matsuoka, Clearance of Fear Memory from the Hippocampus Through Neurogenesis by
Omega-3 Fatty Acids: A Novel Preventive Strategy for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder?, 5 BIOPSYCHOSOCIAL
MED. 3, 4 (2011).
16
Meghan O’Rourke, Train Your Brain: The New Mania for Neuroplasticity, SLATE (Apr. 25, 2007, 8:55
PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/life/brains/2007/04/train_your_brain.html.
17
Alberini, supra note 2, at 3.
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consolidated for long-term storage into the hard drive that is the cortex of the
brain.18 During this initial window of time that the memory is first in the brain’s
RAM and has not yet been consolidated, it remains unstable.19 As the brain
moves the memory from short-term to long-term storage, it synthesizes new
proteins that strengthen the connections between neurons.20 After a day or two,
the event has been etched into our minds.21 As a result, each time we recall an
experience, it comes out of long-term storage and goes back into the short-term
cache. From there, the memory is reconsolidated into long-term storage.22
During the fragile period of memory consolidation, if brain activity is
tampered with (such as through drug administration), then a long-term memory
of the event might never form.23 It is as though the computer were switched off
before clicking save. A drug such as propranolol (long used as a first-line drug
therapy for cardiovascular care) may do precisely that, by preventing
noradrenaline from binding to its receptors in the amygdala.24 Several studies
have confirmed that administering propranolol within six hours of a traumatic
event substantially reduces the likelihood a trauma victim will experience PTSD
by disrupting the affective experience of the memory.25
This same effect can even be achieved without drugs. One research team has
shown that playing the video game Tetris (a simple visuospatial task)
substantially reduces the flashback symptoms of PTSD when played
continuously up to four hours post-trauma.26 In studies of other species,
scientists have selectively erased long-term memories by precisely blocking
protein molecules involved in maintaining those memories,27 by weakening the
communication between specific neural pathways in the brain,28 or by

18

Matsuoka, supra note 15, at 2–3.
Willyard, supra note 1, at 483.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 482.
22
Id.
23
Alberini, supra note 2, at 3.
24
Willyard, supra note 1.
25
Kilpatrick, supra note 12. In a randomized placebo-controlled ten-day trial of propranolol beginning
six hours after a traumatic event, 30% in the placebo group and 18% in the propranolol group developed PTSD.
Id. A subsequent nonrandomized controlled trial of propranolol with survivors of motor vehicle accidents or
victims of physical assault yielded similar results. Id.
26
Emily A. Holmes et al., Key Steps in Developing a Cognitive Vaccine Against Traumatic Flashbacks:
Visuospatial Tetris Versus Verbal Pub Quiz, 5 PLOS ONE 1, 5 (2010).
27
Jiangyuan Hu et al., Selective Erasure of Distinct Forms of Long-Term Synaptic Plasticity Underlying
Different Forms of Memory in the Same Postsynaptic Neuron, 27 CURRENT BIOLOGY 1888, 1888 (2017).
28
Woong Bin Kim & Jun-Hyeong Cho, Encoding of Discriminative Fear Memory by Input-Specific LTP
in the Amygdala, 95 NEURON 1129, 1129 (2017).
19
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administering a toxin that targets the brain cells necessary to maintain a
memory.29
With these novel interventions, we could one day choose to blunt ourselves
from the emotional pain and suffering that accompanies the recall of traumatic
experiences. In the case of rape, this decision comes shortly after the traumatic
event. But it is also possible to make this choice beforehand. Soldiers, for
example, might take a pill before going into battle, to blunt the trauma to come.
Earlier memory modification techniques posed less significant quandaries
than those of today by offering wholesale memory dampening.
Electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) has long been used to impair the memory of
patients.30 Entire memories from the days and weeks prior to ECT have been
permanently degraded.31 Earlier drug interventions have been used to dampen
or extinguish entire memories. The ingestion of alcohol and other mind-altering
substances can cause blackouts that prevent conscious awareness and the
formation of memories of experiences. These wholesale memory modification
techniques bear on the broader value of cognitive liberty but have never become
widespread in use.32
The brain interventions of today are importantly different. They offer the
possibility of selective forgetting, by disassociating the pain and suffering from
the factual content of the experience itself. The fear and emotion associated with
the memory of a traumatic event could be lessened, while the factual content
would be preserved.33 For our hypothetical rape victim, propranolol would allow
her to recall the facts of the sexual assault that she endured, but not the emotional
fear and trauma she suffered. This decreases her risk of developing PTSD, which
is akin to reliving emotional trauma over and over again each time a memory is

29

Jin-Hee Han et al., Selective Erasure of a Fear Memory, 323 SCIENCE 1492, 1492 (2009).
Jan-Otto Ottosson, Experimental Studies of Memory Impairment After Electroconvulsive Therapy, 35
ACTA PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 103, 103 (1960); see, e.g., Maximilian Gahr, Electroconvulsive Therapy
and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: First Experience with Conversation-Based Reactivation of Traumatic
Memory Contents and Subsequent ECT-Mediated Impairment of Reconsolidation, 26 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY &
CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCES E38, E38 (2014); Marijn C W Kroes et al., An Electroconvulsive Therapy Procedure
Impairs Reconsolidation of Episodic Memories in Humans, 17 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 204, 204 (2014).
31
Anne B. Donahue, Electroconvulsive Therapy and Memory Loss: A Personal Journey, 16 J. ECT 133,
134, 138 (2000).
32
Reagan R. Wetherill & Kim Fromme, Alcohol-Induced Blackouts: A Review of Recent Clinical
Research with Practical Implications and Recommendations for Future Studies, 40 ALCOHOLISM CLINICAL &
EXPERIMENTAL RES. 922, 922 (2017).
33
Stephen Maren, Seeking a Spotless Mind: Extinction, Deconsolidation, and Erasure of Fear Memory,
70 NEURON 830, 836 (2011); see Lars Schwabe & Oliver T. Wolf, New Episodic Learning Interferes with the
Reconsolidation of Autobiographical Memories, 4 PLOS ONE e7519, e7519 (2009).
30
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evoked. By remembering the facts alone, she would remember the rape, perhaps,
as though it were a movie she had once seen. Her relationship to that memory
would be forever changed.
There are serious consequences to disaggregating emotions from facts.
Reducing the emotional charge associated with a memory might weaken the
strength of the declarative memory itself. The strength—and therefore the longterm accuracy—of memories are enhanced when the emotional stimuli
accompanying that memory is consolidated along with it. Would a weakened
memory impair a victim’s ability to testify against her perpetrator?
Weakened declarative memory is just one of the consequences to changing
our memories. Our self-identities and societal norms are challenged by these
changes. The ability to selectively shape and change the brain opens a Pandora’s
box of legal, ethical, and social concerns.34
B. The Pandora’s Box of Memory Modification
Our legal norms ought to treat choices that preserve the narrative thread of
our own lives as reasonable. An essential element of narrative self-identity is
that our sense of self cohere with reality.35 Even narratives that are factually
correct can seem clearly wrong if an individual has a bizarre interpretation or
reaction to the facts. When a person is paranoid, for example, their interpretation
of the facts may be utterly at odds with reality.36 A person may be depressed or
angry, by contrast, which would not make their interpretation incomprehensible.
Therapies that would tamper with memories to selectively eliminate or blunt an
individual’s emotional response may violate this coherence with reality because
one’s memory will be at odds with how that person really felt at the time, and
how a person would actually experience and remember a traumatic event.37
Our affective experiences of past events enable us to learn about ourselves
and predict how we will navigate future circumstances. They help us understand
how we may act when confronted with traumatic events in the future, and
perhaps give us greater emotional fortitude to face life events knowing that we

34
For an elegant and extensive discussion of the ethical, legal, and social implications of memory
modification, see Adam J. Kolber, Therapeutic Forgetting: The Legal and Ethical Implications of Memory
Dampening, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1561, 1566 (2006).
35
MARYA SCHECHTMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF SELVES 108, 112, 119–25 (1996). At the heart of
philosophical accounts of personhood or self-identity, too, from John Locke onwards is the role of memory.;
Stanley B. Klein & Shaun Nichols, Memory and the Sense of Personal Identity, 121 MIND 677, 677 (2012).
36
SCHECHTMAN, supra note 35, at 126.
37
Id. at 128.
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have survived past ones. Facing legal pressure to modify or forget past
experiences may deprive us of this learning.
Memory modifications that change our affective experience and reaction to
trauma may also fundamentally reshape our moral response to a significant life
event. Matthew Liao, Anders Sandberg, and Julian Savulescu illustrate this idea:
Suppose that you are hit by a drunk driver and given a treatment to
soften the emotional memory at the hospital. Later you reencounter the
driver. Looking back at the event you certainly feel that it was a bad
event, but you do not feel the anguish you would perhaps otherwise
have felt. When the driver asks for forgiveness, is there a risk that you
would forgive him too easily?38

Similarly, would changing the affective experience of a tortious wrong lead
individuals to forgive wrongdoers too easily by changing their moral reactions
to the wrongs they endured? Should a legal norm exist that encourages this?
Consider the implications for society beyond the individual tort victim.
There is social value to memory, particularly where witnessing and
remembering major life events, such as the September 11th attacks on the World
Trade Center or landing the Mars Curiosity Rover, may be critical to individual
and ultimately societal development of social norms.
One scholar gives a powerful example by considering Martin Luther King
Jr.’s childhood, which was marked with traumatic experiences arising from
racial discrimination. Had King blunted the emotional experience associated
with these memories rather than using his affective experience to inspire his fight
for equality, King may never have become the great civil rights advocate that he
did, and the world would have been far worse off for it.39
Legal norms should not be at odds with the preservation of self-narratives.
And we should not refuse to compensate an individual who suffers emotionally
at the hands of another for continuing their own life story. But courts are
decidedly unsure of when and if emotional distress injuries should be modified,
lest the damages of an individual be diminished.

38
S. Matthew Liao et al., Should We Be Erasing Memories?, PRAC. ETHICS BLOG (Nov. 3, 2008),
http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2008/11/should-we-be-erasing-memories.
39
Joseph Yukov, Enduring Questions and the Ethics of Memory Blunting, 3 J. AMER. PHIL. ASS’N 227,
246 (2017).
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II. LEGALLY AVOIDING PAIN AND SUFFERING
Compensation in tort law for ordinary bodily pain is treated differently than
the mental distress that follows.40 The reasons for this, as discussed below, are
myriad, including that emotional distress injuries have traditionally been viewed
as difficult to prove, quantify, and justify.41
Although the discussion that follows on the historical compensation for
physical versus emotional distress injuries sheds light on current tort law
doctrine for damages, that history still leaves unresolved whether a plaintiff’s
recovery for emotional distress injuries should be limited by the doctrine of
avoidable consequences. For ordinary physical injuries, courts weigh the risks
of a recommended treatment, such as the likelihood and severity of pain it may
cause, the risks of further injury, and the likelihood of its success.42 Do these
same factors apply equally to the mitigation of invisible injuries like the
emotional suffering and pain of rape? The opinions below reveal that the answer
to that question remains altogether unclear.
A. Bodily Pain and Mental Distress
For the rape victim who sues her attacker, the physical and emotional injuries
she suffered when attacked are compensable, but so is the emotional distress that
follows from the memory.43 And yet the compensation for her bodily pain is
treated differently than the mental distress she suffers.44

40
Rick Swedloff & Peter Huang, Tort Damages and the New Science of Happiness, 85 IND. L.J. 553, 579
n.135 (2010). For a discussion of the historical evolution of awarding mental distress damages, see Betsey J.
Grey, Neuroscience and Emotional Harm in Tort Law: Rethinking the American Approach to Free-Standing
Emotional Distress Claims 1, in 13 LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES (Michael Freeman, ed.,
2011).
41
Id.; Deirdre M. Smith, Diagnosing Liability: The Legal History of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 84
TEMP. L. REV. 1, 15 (2011).
42
See, e.g., Hayes v. United States., 367 F.2d 340, 341 (2d Cir. 1966) (finding it unreasonable to select
the longer treatment rather than the shorter course of treatment, which would have involved pain and minor
surgery, and reducing pain and suffering awards to make consistent with the shorter course of treatment); Rounds
v. Rush Trucking Corp., 51 F. Supp. 2d 374, 383 (W.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding that, absent evidence medical
treatment would have been superior to chiropractic manipulations used, award of damages was not excessive);
Young v. Am. Exp. Ibrandsten Lines, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 447, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (examining the risks of the
surgical procedure, the physical condition of the plaintiff and deeming it unreasonable to refuse surgical
treatment); Collova v. Mutual Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., 99 N.W.2d 740, 743 (Wis. 1959) (“No injured person is
required to undergo surgery or treatment that is hazardous or unduly expensive but one injured by the wrong of
another is obliged to exercise reasonable care to minimize damages.”).
43
Swedloff & Huang, supra note 40, at 579.
44
Id. at 579 n.135; see also Grey, supra note 40, at 1.
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Other scholars have explained well the bodily/mental divide in tort law:
As a start, physical harm, or bodily injury, could be defined as injury
to any part of the body that is not the brain, plus injury to the structures
of the brain through trauma or tumor, independent of changes in neural
circuitry. Purely emotional harm could be defined as changes to one’s
neural pathways or balance of neurotransmitters that impact one’s
moods, thoughts, feelings, and cognition, and are not the immediate,
direct result of physical trauma or structural changes within the body.
At the margins, there may be difficulties classifying a particular injury
as physical or emotional. However, this definition captures what the
Restatement terms as ‘the ordinary distinction between bodily harm
and emotional harm.’ Fright, shame, anger, and schizophrenia are all
considered emotional and psychological concerns, while brain tumors,
broken bones, and inflammation of the brain are all physical injuries.45

Courts have historically regarded emotional distress injuries with
skepticism, purportedly because such injuries were so hard to prove, quantify,
and justify.46 Professors John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky argue that courts
are engaged in legal norm-setting “of fostering the thick-skinned response of
getting on with life, rather than dwelling in one’s upset,” and recognizing that
the plaintiff “bears responsibility for the depth of emotional harm she feels.”47
Nevertheless, since the beginning of the twentieth century, U.S. courts have
recognized emotional distress damages for a wide array of actions, including
deceit, invasion of privacy, defamation, malicious prosecution, false
imprisonment, and more.48
But these sorts of damages remain controversial,49 and continue to face
scrutiny by courts and commentators.50 Professor Erica Goldberg, for example,
argues that because emotions are more within our control than other physical
injuries, the law ought to limit compensation for emotional injuries because
individuals have the ability to protect their own minds.51 Others argue that the
valuations of emotional distress are so variable that they confound predictable
deterrence ex ante and reasonable settlement of claims ex post.52 How can we
45

Erica Goldberg, Emotional Duties, 47 CONN. L. REV. 809, 846 (2015) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
HARM § 4 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2010)).
46
Id.; Smith, supra note 30, at 15.
47
Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 8, at 1681.
48
Eugene Kontorovich, The Mitigation of Emotional Distress Damages, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 491, 493
(2001); Developments in the Law of Damages, 61 HARV. L. REV. 113, 139 (1947)
49
Noah, supra note 7, at 439.
50
See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 45.
51
Id. at 841.
52
Noah, supra note 7, at 441–42.
OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
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determine, for example, the financial equivalent of PTSD that develops from
being sexually assaulted?
For at least some injuries, tort compensation for emotional suffering has
broad support, where no reasonable person could be expected to endure a
particular kind of insult.53 Tort compensation for the emotional suffering
following intentional wrongs such as rape may do more. Acknowledging these
sorts of damages may help reify social norms against the wrongdoing and in
support of the plaintiff’s bodily integrity.54 These damages recognize the
enduring impact of the assault on the victim, and express additional social
condemnation of the act and its consequences.

B. The Doctrine of Avoidable Consequences
Wherever one draws the line about what is compensable as an emotional
distress injury, that line still leaves unresolved whether a plaintiff’s recovery
should be limited by the doctrine of avoidable consequences. This doctrine
(sometimes inaptly called a “duty” to mitigate injuries) is a widely accepted
principle in law that limits the amount of damages a plaintiff can recover for her
injuries in a civil case.55 Victims of tortious wrongdoing are awarded damages
to restore them to the position they would otherwise have enjoyed absent the
wrongdoing.56 But the doctrine limits the damages a defendant must pay for
losses the plaintiff reasonably could have avoided based on their own actions
after being injured.57 If someone breaks your arm, they are liable for pain,
suffering, and medical bills associated with the broken arm. But if you
unreasonably refuse any treatment, and so the arm gets gangrene and must be

53
Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 8, at 1686–88 (recognizing that there are circumstances under which
one has a visceral response to “extreme imperilment or serious injury to another” or where it is unreasonable for
a court to send the message of “‘get over it’” or “‘keep a stiff upper lip’” because of the severity of the
circumstances giving rise to the injury).
54
Noah, supra note 7, at 440 (also noting the greater deterrent signal such damages offer, as well as
compensation for attorneys to bring such claims).
55
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1977); Yehuda Adar, Comparative
Negligence and Mitigation of Damages: Two Sister-Doctrines in Search of Reunion, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV.
783, 792 (2013) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1979)). Note also
that despite the call in the Third Restatement of the Apportionment of Liability to abolish the mitigation of
damages doctrine from tort law in the year 2000, this call has gone unheeded and unacknowledged by courts
and commentators alike. Id. at 793–94.
56
John C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages: Fair v. Full Compensation, 55 DEPAUL L.
REV. 435, 435 (2006).
57
JOSEPH CHITTY, CHITTY ON CONTRACTS 1478–79 (Hugh G. Beale Gen. ed., 29th ed. 2004); HARVEY
MCGREGOR, MCGREGOR ON DAMAGES 235–36 (18th ed. 2009).
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amputated, the defendant is only liable for an ordinary broken arm, not an
amputated one.58
This rule promotes self-reliance as societally efficient. Injured individuals
are often in the best position to mitigate their injuries, and society benefits from
decreasing the costs of accidents.59 For these reasons, modern tort law continues
to impose a social duty on plaintiffs to make reasonable efforts to prevent the
worsening of their injuries.60
The doctrine is not without limits. Individuals need only act reasonably to
mitigate their damages, and are “not ordinarily required to surrender a right of
substantial value in order to minimize loss.”61 What constitutes reasonable effort
and substantial value, however, are often contested.62 A plaintiff is not required
to go beyond what an average, prudent individual would do to minimize her
injuries.63 For ordinary physical injuries, courts weigh the risks of a
recommended treatment, such as the likelihood and severity of pain it may cause,
the risks of further injury, and the likelihood of its success.64 A plaintiff could
reasonably forgo serious, major, or critical surgical interventions,65 or treatments

58

Walter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 748 A.2d 961, 970 (Me. 2000).
Kontorovich, supra note 48, at 496–97 (explaining that the doctrine reduces the moral hazard created
by tort insurance that might otherwise incentivize a tort victim to allow her injuries to worsen for greater
compensation); Developments, supra note 48, at 131 (“[I]n the interest of conserving human and material
resources, a plaintiff should not be permitted to recover for losses which accumulate while he sits idly by.”).
60
Adar, supra note 55, at 814.
61
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
62
Developments, supra note 48, at 131.
63
Id.; Adar, supra note 55, at 835.
64
See, e.g., Hayes v. United States., 367 F.2d 340, 341 (2d Cir. 1966) (finding it unreasonable to select
the longer treatment rather than the shorter course of treatment, which would have involved pain and minor
surgery, and reducing pain and suffering awards to make consistent with the shorter course of treatment); Rounds
v. Rush Trucking Corp., 51 F. Supp. 2d 374, 383 (W.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that, absent evidence medical
treatment would have been superior to chiropractic manipulations used, award of damages was not excessive);
Young v. Am. Exp. Ibrandsten Lines, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 447, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (examining the risks of the
surgical procedure, the physical condition of the plaintiff and deeming it unreasonable to refuse surgical
treatment); Collova v. Mutual Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., 99 N.W.2d 740, 743 (Wis. 1959) (“No injured person is
required to undergo surgery or treatment that is hazardous or unduly expensive but one injured by the wrong of
another is obliged to exercise reasonable care to minimize damages.”).
65
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 178 S.W.2d 4, 6 (Ark. 1936) (“The rule of general application seems to
be that a person is not required to undergo a major surgical operation against his will for the purpose of freeing
another from consequent damages; on the other hand, a simple minor surgical operation may be compelled only
where a reasonably prudent person would submit thereto.”); White v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 124 N.W. 309, 311
(Iowa 1910) (holding no right more sacred than the right of an individual to be free from restraint or interference
with others, and so unless small risk and small inconvenience it is reasonable to refuse surgery); Louisville
Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Byrnes, 178 S.W.2d 4, 6 (Ky. 1944) (finding that an individual is not required to
submit to an operation or suffer a reduction in damages if there are serious risks and possible failure); Williams
v. Campbell, 185 So. 683, 688–89 (La. App. 1938) (holding that a an injured person is not required to undergo
59
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unlikely to be effective.66
Do these same factors apply equally to the mitigation of invisible injuries,
like the emotional suffering and pain of rape? Does society similarly benefit
from placing a social expectation upon victims to decrease their emotional
suffering? Based on current doctrine, the answers to these questions remain
unclear.
C. How Courts Address Mitigating Emotional Injuries
There has been scant little theoretical work done on whether the doctrine of
avoidable consequences should apply to emotional distress injuries.67 Much of
the scholarship that has been written favors applying the doctrine equally to
these injuries. Professor Lars Noah, for example, has argued that advances in
treatment of emotional distress favor applying the avoidable consequences
doctrine to those damages as well.68 Other scholars have made similar arguments
about how advances in neuroscience and psychology support limiting recovery
for emotional distress injuries based on the mitigation employed.69 Professor
Noah focused on the favorable effects of this approach: The cost to mitigate the
damages could provide a baseline from which to calculate noneconomic
damages,70 and further encourage victims to take reasonable steps to reduce the
severity of their emotional injuries, by rewarding mitigating efforts over
persistent complaints of enduring pain.71 He argues that it might also improve
clarity over the role of rewarding noneconomic damages by limiting those
rewards to the category of untreatable pain and suffering, such as the loss of

an amputation because of the risks of doing so and the hope that the limb might be saved).
66
Jennifer Parobek, God v. the Mitigation of Damages Doctrine: Why Religion Should be Considered a
Pre-Existing Condition, 20 J.L. & HEALTH 107, 112 (2006).
67
Cf. Kontorovich, supra note 48, at 493 (2001) (focusing on the moral hazard created by a psychiatric
mitigation rule, where there is a value to psychiatric treatment use apart from the mitigation itself).
68
Noah, supra note 7, at 474.
69
E.g., Grey, supra note 40, at 204 (arguing, using developments in neuroscience, that the historical
distinction between physical and emotional distress claims should be abandoned in favor of a unitary view of
damages); Kevin C. Klein & G. Nicole Hininger, Mitigation of Psychological Damages: An Economic Analysis
of the Avoidable Consequences Doctrine and Its Applicability to Emotional Distress Injuries, 29 OKLA. CITY U.
L. REV. 405, 414–15 (2004) (reviewing new treatment options for depression and pain as evidence that the
historic distinction between emotional distress and physical damages should be abandoned); cf. Goldberg, supra
note 45, at 848 (while arguing in favor of a duty to cope with the emotional stress on sufferers, states that
fashioning this as “an actual duty to mitigate, however, would be unwieldy and require proof of steps taken to
mitigate emotional damages that could compromise plaintiffs’ autonomy and privacy interests in their medical
and mental health decisions”).
70
Noah, supra note 7, at 474.
71
Id. at 476.
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enjoyment of life or pain and suffering unresponsive to modern medical
interventions.72
Courts are not nearly as certain about whether the doctrine of avoidable
consequences applies to emotional distress injuries.73 Across the board they
issue exceedingly tentative and often inconsistent opinions about its
applicability to emotional pain and suffering. Perhaps this is because at least
some courts intuit that rather different costs are at stake in these cases: the impact
of the proposed treatment on the personality, self-identity, and the dignity of
plaintiffs.74 In other words, some courts at least implicitly recognize its impact
on cognitive liberty.
1. Treating Emotional Distress Damages Differently
Some courts express serious discomfort with requiring plaintiffs to
undertake mitigating treatments that change their brain states and affect their
personality, self-identity, and personal autonomy. These courts also recognize
that emotional distress could render a Plaintiff unable or unwilling to seek
treatment because of its effect on individual agency.75 The more intrusive upon
personality a method of treatment seems, the less likely these courts will find a
plaintiff unreasonable for refusing it.
72

Id. at 477.
See, e.g., Klein and Hininger, supra note 69, at 407; Kontorovich, supra note 48, at 493–94; Noah,
supra note 7, at 448 (arguing that with advances in treatment of pain and suffering, judicial hesitance to apply
the doctrine makes little sense).
74
E.g., Pool v. City of Oakland, 728 P.2d 1163, 1172 (Cal. 1986) (finding a duty to mitigate emotional
distress damages when police had wrongfully arrested him for passing counterfeit currency, but that defendant
introduced no evidence that the suggested failure to mitigate—making a phone call from jail—would have
reduced his time in jail and therefore emotional suffering that resulted); Panion v. United States, 385 F. Supp.
2d 1071, 1088 (D. Haw. 2005). After plaintiff was sexually assaulted by a nurse while unable to defend herself
in the hospital, she suffered debilitating psychological injuries including PTSD. Id. She did not participate in a
full regiment of counseling but she had an “understandable mistrust of medical personnel after she was assaulted
in a hospital by a nurse.” Id.
75
E.g., Templeton v. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co., 628 N.E.2d 442, 453–54 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (finding
a jury determination that plaintiff had not failed to mitigate his damages, when, inter alia, he refused to cooperate
with a psychological treatment plan for depression, even though the expert physician believed that appropriate
medication and psychotherapy would have cured his depression. His lack of insight into his own problems
precluded him from seeking the treatment he needed); Stemple v. Bores, 2005 WL 4186814 at *1, *8 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. July 19, 2006) (finding that the jury should not have been instructed on the duty to mitigate
emotional distress injuries. The emotional distress that plaintiffs suffered as a result of defendant’s negligence
led them to reject the needed counseling so there was no factual basis for having submitted the issue of mitigation
to the jury); Feld v. Merriam, 461 A.2d 225, 234 n.12 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983). This case concerned the rape of
plaintiff at gunpoint, in front of her husband, the court rejected the defendant’s contention that the husband failed
to mitigate his own damages by failing to seek professional counseling. Id. The court found that because the
rejection of psychiatric treatment was a manifestation of his emotional injuries, he was not precluded from
recovering damages. Id.
73
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Consider, for example, treatments that cause a change in personality such as
electroshock therapy for the treatment of depression. In Dohman v. Richard,76 a
plaintiff who had been negligently struck by a truck suffered pain in his left leg,
hip, head, neck, and testicles. Although his ordinary physical injuries were “not
overly serious,” he suffered significant depression following the accident.77 He
was initially treated with high doses of tranquilizers and antidepressants, but
eventually had no further hope for improvement of his mental condition with
continued treatment of that kind.78 His physician then recommended
electroshock treatment for the plaintiff, claiming the treatment had an 80–90%
chance of successfully treating the depression.79 The defendant unsuccessfully
sought to limit the plaintiff’s damages for refusing that treatment.80 In rejecting
the defendant’s claim, the court distinguished “treatment[s] of the mind” from
treating other physical injuries: “Plaintiff is not being asked to have a fractured
bone placed in a cast, a hernia repaired, or any other conventional form of
surgery. Instead it is proposed that he subject himself to electro-shock, a form of
treatment designed to work a change in his personality.”81 Recognizing that
personality-impacting interventions are different from other forms of self-care,
the court was “not prepared to hold at this time that psychiatric therapy of this
sort falls within the spirit, or the letter, of that line of jurisprudence which
requires injured persons to mitigate their damages.”82
On occasion, treatments that insult the personal dignity of the plaintiff have
also been rejected. In Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Goodin,83 a wheelchairbound individual went on a four-day cruise with the prior assurance by Carnival
Cruise Lines that it had wheelchair-accessible bathrooms and showers on
board.84 In fact, not a single bathroom on the entire ship was wheelchair
accessible.85 The plaintiff had to rely upon others to help him into and out of the
bathrooms, causing him significant emotional distress and embarrassment.86 He
76

282 So. 2d 789, 792 (La. Ct. App. 1973).
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 793.
80
Id. at 794.
81
Id. at 793.
82
Id. at 794; see also Gottfried v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 1995 WL 12478 at *1, *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 1995),
where the defendant argued Plaintiff had failed to mitigate his damages by refusing to undergo electroshock
treatment as recommended by his treating psychiatrist. The court allowed the affirmative defense to go forward
because while electroshock treatment may involve risks, “[W]e do not agree with the plaintiffs that [plaintiff’s]
refusal to undergo electric shock therapy is, as a matter of law, reasonable.” Id.
83
535 So. 2d 98, 100 (Ala. 1988).
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
77
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felt so deeply humiliated by the situation that he refused to allow stewards
onboard to assist him.87 In response to his suit against Carnival Cruise Lines, the
defendants argued he should have accepted such assistance to mitigate his own
injuries.88 The court concluded that his refusal to accept assistance “was not
unreasonable” because of “the delicate matter of [plaintiff’s] dignity
involved.”89
Sometimes, courts recognize the value of self-reliance and selfdetermination of plaintiffs in overcoming their emotional injuries over medical
interventions. When a flight attendant who survived a commercial airline crash
sued for emotional injuries, the court validated his choice to rely on self-help
instead of antidepressant medication to mitigate his depression as consistent
with his personality.90 Traumatized by what he witnessed after the crash—
charred and decapitated bodies, bodies with missing body parts—he had also
labored under the fear of his own probable death.91 Since the accident, plaintiff
had made substantial efforts to regain a normal life, but he experienced
depression and PTSD, irritability and anxiety, and an overall flat affect.92 He
attended therapy for over two years, but experts opined that he was unlikely to
fully recover to his pre-accident self.93 Although defendant had refused taking
antidepressant medication, the court found his refusal “not a wholly
unreasonable choice.”94
The language in each of the above cases is exceedingly tentative. “Under the
present circumstances” and “not prepared to hold at this time” speak of
uncertainty and caution. These are the words of judges unsure of how to legally
recognize their uneasy sense that mitigating the mind may be different in kind.

87

Id.
Id. at 103.
89
Id.
90
In re Air Crash Disaster at Charlotte, N.C. on July 2, 1994, 982 F. Supp. 1101, 1112 (D.S.C. 1997).
91
Id. at 1105.
92
Id. at 1106.
93
Id. at 1106–07.
94
Id. at 1112 (“He has, instead, made major efforts in other ways and obviously declined the reliance on
medication based on the same attitude of self-reliance and determination that have brought him thus far in his
recovery. Therefore, the court does not find this personal choice to be a failure to mitigate damages under the
present circumstances.”). Even in Title VII cases pertaining to statutory duties to mitigate loss of front pay by
an employee, at least one court has recognized that a refusal to attend therapy and take medications is a
reasonable choice, because “[i]t would be unreasonable for the Court to require Plaintiff to take medications that
impair her cognitive ability.” Pollard v. E.l. Dupont de Nemours, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 2d 865, 879 (W.D. Tenn.
2003).
88
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2. Treating Emotional Damages the Same
Other courts draw no distinction whatsoever between physical and
emotional distress injuries, holding that the doctrine of avoidable consequences
applies equally to both. These courts embrace treatments of the mind as relevant
to whether a plaintiff reasonably mitigated her emotional distress injuries and
give jury instructions on the same.
In an employment discrimination case, for example, an Oregon district court
judge held that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiffs,
who alleged the defendant created a sexually hostile work environment, ought
to have had their damages reduced for failing to seek psychological counseling.95
The court relied on a long line of other cases that had applied the doctrine of
avoidable consequences to emotional distress damage to justify its decision.96
For some courts, a duty to mitigate emotional distress in principle might
include an obligation to take antidepressant medications, seek psychotherapy, or
even undergo electroshock treatment.97 Applying the same standard for
95

See EEOC v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1115 (D. Or. 2013) (on reconsideration

in part).
96
Id. at 1114–15 (first citing Petroci v. Transworld Sys., Inc., No. 12-00729, 2012 WL 5464597, at *4
(W.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2012) (applying the doctrine of avoidable consequences to emotional distress injuries by
holding that defendants should be given the opportunity to determine through discovery in a Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act violation case whether plaintiff failed to mitigate her actual—not statutory—damages, by, for
example, failing to seek medical or psychological counseling for her alleged emotional distress); then citing Neal
v. Dir., D.C. Dep’t of Corr., No. 93-2420, 1995 WL 517249, at *15 (D.D.C. Aug. 9, 1995) (reducing plaintiffs
damages for refusal to take antidepressants to mitigate her depression following injury); then citing In re Air
Crash Disaster at Charlotte, N.C. on July 2, 1994, 982 F. Supp. 1101, 1111 (D.S.C. 1997) (in holding that even
though plaintiff refused to take antidepressants, he did not fail to mitigate damages, the court explained that a
plaintiff has the duty to mitigate damages and the “court can consider whether that person has failed to follow
the advice of their physician or other treating professional”) (citation omitted); then citing Salas v. United
States, 974 F. Supp. 202, 211 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (implicitly finding a duty to mitigate by concluding that plaintiff
cannot be charged with a failure to mitigate damages because she made reasonable efforts to treat and cure her
condition); then citing Baker v. Dorfman, 1999 WL 191531, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1999) (holding that a jury
could have reasonably concluded, after receiving an instruction on mitigation of damages related to pain and
suffering, that plaintiff took reasonable steps to alleviate his distress); then citing Rogan v. Lewis, 975 F. Supp.
956, 966 n. 14 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (explaining that plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies may be
relevant to plaintiff’s failure to mitigate emotional damages); and then citing Chuy v. Phila. Eagles Football
Club, 431 F. Supp. 254, 263–64 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (upholding a jury instruction on mitigation of emotional
damages), aff’d, 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979)).
97
See, e.g., Maynard v. Ferno-Washington, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1173, 1176 (E.D. Wash. 1998)
(finding a genuine issue of disputed fact as to whether plaintiff, a volunteer EMT thrown from an ambulance
while unloading a patient, had failed to mitigate her own emotional distress injuries because “she failed to seek
psychiatric intervention or the prescription of anti-depressants”); Gottfried v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., No. 94 C 5249,
1995 WL 12478, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 1995) (“[T]here is nothing before us regarding the nature of [electric
shock therapy]. Thus, we do not agree with the plaintiffs that [plaintiff’s] refusal to undergo electric shock
therapy is, as a matter of law, reasonable.”); see also Hetzel v. County of Prince William, 89 F.3d 169, 172–73
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reasonable mitigation to emotional and ordinary physical injuries, courts have
reduced plaintiffs’ damages with the judgment that they unreasonably failed to
mitigate their emotional distress.98
3. Analogous Physical Tort Law Cases
A plaintiff’s personality and identity can also be impacted by treatments of
ordinary physical injuries. Courts have similarly struggled with whether the
doctrine of avoidable consequences should apply when a plaintiff raises
religious or procreative concerns about proposed treatments.
Jurors have been instructed to consider the tort doctrine of avoidable
consequences when plaintiffs have raised a religious objection to a treatment,
such as a refusal by a Jehovah’s Witness to accept a blood transfusion in a lifethreatening situation.99 In these cases, courts have instructed jurors to consider

(4th Cir. 1996) (vacating emotional distress award in a discrimination case as excessive because the plaintiff did
not suffer noticeable physical injuries and never saw a doctor or a therapist for his claimed emotional distress,
and remanding for reconsideration). In Fox v. Evans, 111 P.3d 267, 268–69, 271 (Wash. App. 2005), the court
affirmed the trial court’s instruction to the jury on failure to mitigate regarding the plaintiff’s refusal to accept a
diagnosis of depression, undergo psychotherapy, or take antidepressants to lessen her emotional pain and
suffering resulting from a car accident. On appeal, the plaintiff did not present as an issue and the court did not
explore whether the doctrine of avoidable consequences applies to emotional distress injuries. Id.
98
In Skaria v. State, Skaria suffered severe emotional distress and became phobic of leaving the house
after being raped. 442 N.Y.S.2d 838, 841 (Ct. Cl. 1981). She lost her desire to resume sexual relations with her
husband, and suffered from long-lasting emotional trauma, likely a form of PTSD. Id. Because of her fears, she
and her husband relocated from New York to Texas. Id. Following the initial rape, she was treated by a clinical
psychologist for the severe emotional disorder and fear that prevented her from functioning. Id. Although the
psychologist advised her to continue her treatments when she went to Texas, lest her condition become
permanent, Mrs. Skaria did not seek treatment because she did not want anyone else to know about her rape. Id.
at 841–42. The court restricted its award of damages for long-term suffering she experienced, holding that she
unreasonably failed to mitigate her emotional distress because had had an affirmative duty to seek out and follow
a physician’s advice. Id. at 842. See also Gomez v. Am. Empress Ltd. P’ship, 1999 WL 595330, at *2 (9th Cir.
Aug. 9, 1999) (finding that the court appropriately reduced both economic and non-economic damages when
plaintiff unreasonably failed to mitigate his damages, including harm to his psychological well-being from being
unemployed); Saad’s Healthcare Servs. Inc. v. Meinhardt, 19 So. 3d 847, 856–57 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (holding
compensation benefits in a worker’s compensation claim should be suspended for an eighteen-month period,
during which time plaintiff did not follow up with psychiatric treatment and medication for depression,
constituting unreasonable refusal for treatment), aff’d sub nom. Ex parte Saad’s Healthcare Servs., Inc., 19 So.
3d 862 (Ala. 2008), as modified on denial of reh’g (Apr. 3, 2009); Grieff v. Par. of Jefferson, 780 So. 2d 425,
435 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (reducing the amount of damages because Plaintiff failed to seek timely psychiatric
assistance which extended his inability to return to full employability); Munoz v. City of Perth Amboy Police
Dep’t, No. A-6254-06T1, 2009 WL 2244035, at *22 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 29, 2009) (finding that the
trial court properly reduced damages to a police officer who suffered emotional distress from being subject to a
hostile work environment because of his national origin, because he failed to engage in psychotherapy
recommended by a family physician and experts at trial).
99
See Medical Care, Freedom of Religion, and Mitigation of Damages, 87 YALE L.J. 1466 (1978).
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the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s refusal on a case-by-case basis.100 The
opinion in the case of Corlett v. Caserta advances the rationale of this approach,
finding that the voluntary practice of one’s religion does not necessarily entitle
one to impose tort liability upon another:
The freedom to act upon one’s religious convictions does not
encompass the privilege of imposing tort liability on another for
injuries resulting not from another’s tortious conduct, but rather from
the voluntary practice of one’s religious convictions.101

The court in Corlett reasoned that a plaintiff remains free to conscientiously
refuse treatments and therefore can still freely exercise her religion, but that, in
rendering its judgment on compensation, a jury need not financially reward the
plaintiff’s exercise of religious beliefs.102 Other courts have similarly instructed
juries to consider on a case-by-case basis the plaintiff’s religious beliefs together
with all other evidence in determining whether the plaintiff acted reasonably in
caring for her injuries.103
Conversely, some courts have ruled as a matter of law on the doctrine of
avoidable consequences in suits concerning the wrongful birth of children.104
Because the “treatments” available—abortion or adoption—are such profound,
life-altering choices, courts have near-universally held that defendants cannot
use plaintiffs’ choices as a reason to reduce plaintiffs’ damages.105
100
For a detailed discussion of whether the case-by-case approach violates the First Amendment, see
Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 900 (1991) (recognizing that weighing a
plaintiff’s religious objections could result in impermissible evaluation of the reasonableness of plaintiff’s
religion, running afoul of the Establishment Clause).
101
562 N.E.2d 257, 262 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
102
Id.
103
See Wilcut v. Innovative Warehousing, 247 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (finding that a decision
by an employee to refuse a blood transfusion based on sincerely held religious beliefs was not unreasonable in
light of his beliefs, so his dependents were owed death benefits); Williams v. Bright, 658 N.Y.S.2d 910, 912
(App. Div. 1997) (noting that the trial jury considered the Plaintiff’s beliefs as a factor in determining whether
the Plaintiff “acted as a reasonable prudent person, under all the circumstances confronting her,” when she
refused a blood transfusion consistent with her religious beliefs as a Jehovah’s Witness following a car accident);
Rozewicz v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 656 N.Y.S.2d 593, 595–96 (Sup. Ct. 1997) (explaining in dicta that
if the case were about mitigation of damages, it would be proper to instruct the jury to ask if refusal of treatment
was based on a sincerely held religious belief and, if so, to not reduce the damages by reason of the injured
party’s refusal).
104
See Comras v. Lewin, 443 A.2d 229, 230 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982).
105
See, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511, 520 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) (a personal choice that the
Plaintiff may suffer more by the choice to abort is not an unreasonable refusal to mitigate damages, and the
weighing of the psychological impact of giving the child up for adoption rather than rearing them cannot be used
as the basis for reducing damages); see also Univ. of Ariz. Health Scis. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 667 P.2d 1294,
1301 (Ariz. 1983) (holding parents in a wrongful pregnancy action cannot have their damages offset by not
choosing abortion or adoption); Chaffee v. Seslar, 751 N.E.2d 773, 788 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“We believe the
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Even choices between competing values that involve procreation are often
excepted, although not with the same absolute terms. When a fourteen-year-old
plaintiff chose to forgo a surgery with a 93% success rate but a risk of life-long
impotence, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the trial jury should not
have been instructed on the doctrine of avoidable consequences.106 Instead, it
affirmed that individuals have a common law right to self-determination and
control over their own bodies.107 Any individual, and in particular a fourteenyear-old boy, could reasonably choose to forgo surgery rather than risk life-long
impotence, so the defendant was not entitled to jury instruction on the issue.108
In all of these cases, courts intuit that something different is at stake, but
there is little consistency to guide other courts or litigants about what is driving
that difference. What is lacking is a proper philosophical lens through which to
view and resolve this theoretical puzzle. The diverging approaches taken by
courts even within the same jurisdiction leave plaintiffs unable to anticipate what
measures, if any, they must take to mitigate emotional distress. The case-by-case
approach leaves the entirety of the decision in the hands of juries about when it
is reasonable or not to undergo a wide variety of treatments aimed at the mind.
And still unresolved is what social duties we impose upon tort victims who
suffer emotionally from the wrongdoing of others.
There is indeed more at stake in whether damage reductions should apply to
emotional distress injuries in tort law.109 Treatments differ in their impact upon
personality, identity, dignity, and the privacy of individuals.110 This interest is
requirement of considering an abortion or placing the child up for adoption [as a form of mitigation in a tort suit]
is unreasonable. We see no reason why a parent who is threatened by future harm by a tortious act should subject
herself to emotional or physical pain of a different kind in order to prevent future harm.”); Smith v. Gore, 728
S.W.2d 738, 751–52 (Tenn. 1987) (“In regard to the extent of damages, a number of courts have discussed the
reasonableness of the alternatives to rearing, i.e., abortion or adoption, as part of the duty to mitigate damages.
Generally, courts seem to have rejected consideration of these alternatives as part of the duty to mitigate. We
think that not only would imposing these choices upon a plaintiff impermissibly infringe upon Constitutional
rights to privacy in these matters, but the nature of these alternatives are so extreme as to be unreasonable,
especially when the recoverable damages do not include the expenses of rearing the child.”).
106
See Cannon v. N.J. Bell Tel., 530 A.2d 345, 346, 348, 352 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987). Cannon
was injured by a dangling telephone wire, which threw him off of his bicycle in a residential neighborhood. Id.
at 346. The seat of the bicycle landed on his groin area. Id. He suffered an urethra bulbous stricture, which
required periodic painful dilation of his urethra as treatment for the rest of his life. Id. at 348. An urologist other
than his treating physician recommended a surgical procedural known as a visual urethrotomy with a 93%
success rate, which, if successful, would relieve his physician and future psychological trauma from the injury.
Id. But the surgery also carried with it the risk of lifetime of psychological or psychogenic impotence. Id.
107
Id. at 351.
108
Id. at 352.
109
Kontorovich recognizes the impact on autonomy and privacy concerns with psychiatric mitigation
while “willpower mitigation” would be difficult to administrate. Kontorovich, supra note 48, at 507–13.
110
Id. at 509–10 (noting that the side effects of psychiatric mitigation are upon the “mind and mood of the
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not captured by “reasonableness” or autonomy alone. Instead, it is captured by
an uncharted kind of liberty in law and in our lives—an interest in cognitive
liberty.
III. THE RIGHT TO COGNITIVE LIBERTY
Cognitive liberty, herein defined, is an interest that ought to be considered
when evaluating the reasonableness of a plaintiff’s refusal or failure to mitigate
their emotional distress injuries. Once defined, it becomes possible to apply to
once-difficult questions in tort law about the applicability of the doctrine of
avoidable consequences to emotional distress injuries. And it can then shed light
on many existing riddles across law.
A. Defining Cognitive Liberty
The right to self-determination over our brains and mental experiences—the
right to cognitive liberty—has not yet been articulated in any legal case, but
courts and scholars have intuited its existence.111 Although this short Article
does not explore all of the facets of cognitive liberty, its contours must be
established to understand its role in tort law.
Cognitive liberty encompasses freedom of thought and rumination, the right
to self-access and self-alteration, and to consent to or refuse changes to our
brains and our mental experiences.112 Like all individual interests, it is not
absolute, but must be balanced against the societal costs it introduces.
When any part of a person’s conduct affects prejudicially the interests of
others, society has some jurisdiction over the conduct. A plaintiff’s exercise of
her cognitive liberty to preserve her memories of her experiences can impact the

patient” and therefore impact autonomy and that mitigation would become part of the public record).
111
See infra Part III.C. See generally J. Braxton Craven, Jr., Personhood: The Right To Be Let Alone, 1976
DUKE L.J. 699 (1976) (discussing the right to personhood); Paul A. Freund, Annual Dinner Address (May 23,
1975), in 52 AM. LAW INST. ANN. MEETING SPEECHES 31, 42–43 (1975) (“The theme of personhood is
. . .emerging. It has been groping, I think, for a rubric. Sometimes it is called privacy, inaptly it would seem to
me; autonomy perhaps, though that seems too dangerously broad. But the idea is that of personhood in the sense
of those attributes of an individual which are irreducible in his selfhood. We all know the agonizing judgments
that have had to be made and that will have to be made in such diverse areas as abortion and the death penalty,
which it seems to me are aspects of this issue of personhood. In the future, this issue is likely to loom ever larger
as we see advances in the biomedical sciences that will lead to genetic engineering and the kinds of precise
behavior control that will test our conceptions of individual responsibility and individuality.”).
112
See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969) (“Whatever the power of the state to control
public dissemination of ideas inimical to the public morality, it cannot constitutionally premise legislation on
the desirability of controlling a person’s private thoughts.”).
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interests of defendants and society. Consequently, there are limits to how it can
and should apply in tort law. And yet, cognitive liberty is so fundamental to all
other freedoms we enjoy that we ought to incorporate strong legal norms that
preserve rather than undermine it.
Cognitive liberty secures authority to individuals over actions essential to
their self-determination.113 Self-determination requires the autonomy to control
one’s own destiny, the competence to do so, and relatedness or connection to
others.114 Through self-determination, individuals can make and remake
themselves in relation to others.115 Self-determination must include deciding
when and how one will alter their own memories and affective experiences.
Like other laws or norms, tort law acts as controlled motivation over
individuals (in contrast to autonomous motivation that arises internally or from
external sources with which an individual identifies their sense of self). That
controlled motivation can serve useful societal functions, but it comes at a cost
to individual freedom. A legal norm that reduces damages for refusing to change
one’s own mental experiences undermines self-determination.
Cognitive liberty secures freedom of individual thought. John Stuart Mill
cautioned against tyranny of thought imposed by society—of trying to shape and
control personal thought through societal use of legal norms and penalties such
as tort law.116 Courts, too, often note that freedom of thought is the scaffold upon
which all other freedoms rely.117 Thoughts arise in our brains as ideas,
ruminations, reactions, reflections, and in images, music, memories, and more.
113
Jane Dryden, Autonomy, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., https://www.iep.utm.edu/autonomy (last
visited Aug. 14, 2019).
114
RICHARD M. RYAN & EDWARD L. DECI, SELF-DETERMINATION THEORY: BASIC PSYCHOLOGICAL
NEEDS IN MOTIVATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND WELLNESS (2017).
115
See generally Anne Donchin, Autonomy and Interdependence: Quandaries in Genetic Decision
Making, in RELATIONAL AUTONOMY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON AUTONOMY, AGENCY, AND THE SOCIAL SELF
236–58 (Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000).
116
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 22–79 (Henry Regnery Co. 1955) (1859).
117
See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (noting that the speech protections
of the First Amendment “are most in danger when the government seeks to control thought,” because “[t]he right
to think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected from the government because speech is the
beginning of thought”); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326–27 (1937) (“[F]reedom of thought . . . is the
matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom. With rare aberrations a pervasive
recognition of this truth can be traced in our history, political and legal.”); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 478 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings
and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in
material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their
sensations. They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”).
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Thoughts—discrete events in our minds—allow us to create
autobiographical self-narrative and interweave the story of who we are.

our

Advanced technology will soon enable our mental processes to be accessed
by others.118 When that happens, in the absence of cognitive liberty, would
anyone dare have a politically dissident thought—or even an unusually creative
one? The fear of reprisal, censorship, embarrassment, or even retaliation by
others could have a terrifying and chilling effect on individual thought. A legal
norm in tort law that would deem as unreasonable a refusal to modify one’s
memories, thoughts, and emotional reaction to past experiences is precisely the
kind of tyranny of thought we should safeguard against.
Cognitive liberty secures to individuals the right to access their own brains
and the authority to preserve or alter the thoughts, memories, and experiences
contained therein. Self-access and control over self-alteration are crucial to the
cultivation of our personality and individuality.119 New technologies from
neuroscience uniquely enable us to access and alter our memories and
experiences in ways never before possible.
Without self-access, we lack self-awareness, and without self-awareness, we
lack the ability to create and maintain our narrative self-identity. Applying the
doctrine of avoidable consequences to emotional distress injuries would create
an inducement to tort victims to self-alter their mental experiences and would
cast a choice to preserve one’s memories and emotional experiences as an
unreasonable action.
Such a norm would also be at odds with the right of individuals to freely
consent to or refuse treatment, including those that would mitigate one’s
emotional injuries. Tort law can have a subtle and not-so-subtle coercive effect
on individuals.120 The ability to change our minds and have them changed
requires our consent. That consent can take an explicit or implicit form—either
expressed or inferred from the facts and circumstances of the specific situation.
Cognitive liberty embraces consent as a fundamental part of self-determination
over our brains. Consent requires a clear appreciation and understanding of the

118
Although discussion of brain access is beyond the scope of this Article, access and decoding of brain
content is discussed at length in Nita A. Farahany, Incriminating Thoughts, 64 STAN. L. REV. 351 (2012) and
Nita A. Farahany, Searching Secrets, 160 U. PENN. L. REV. 1239 (2012); see also Nita Farahany, When
Technology Can Read Our Minds, How Will We Protect Our Privacy?, TED (Nov. 27, 2018),
https://www.ted.com/talks/nita_farahany_when_technology_can_read_minds_how_will_we_protect_our_priv
acy?language=en.
119
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 52–69 (Batoche Books 2001) (1859).
120
See Jules L. Coleman, The Structure of Tort Law, 97 YALE L.J. 1233, 1246 (1988) (book review).
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facts, and the implications and consequences of available treatment options. That
includes the right to decide what information is shared with others and what is
not and what changes one will make and which changes one will refuse.
In short, the right to cognitive liberty is essential to all other legal rights and
is threatened by a legal norm in tort law that would condemn as unreasonable a
choice to preserve one’s memories and mental experiences.
B. Applying Cognitive Liberty to Tort Law
By explicitly recognizing the role of cognitive liberty in our lives and law,
courts and legislators could craft a more deliberate two-tiered approach to
applying the doctrine of avoidable consequences to emotional distress damages
in tort law. As described in detail below, courts could and should decide that
certain treatments would violate a plaintiff’s cognitive liberty as a matter of law
and would therefore be legally unreasonable as a form of mitigation. For other
treatments, its impact on cognitive liberty will be less clear, so a case-by-case
determination with clear instructions to juries will be more appropriate. This
two-tiered approach to addressing the impact of a treatment would allow this
area of law to co-evolve with emerging technology.
First, when a defendant raises the issue of failed mitigation by pointing to
the plaintiff’s forgone emotional distress treatment, when relevant a plaintiff
ought to raise the violation of their cognitive liberty as a reason they chose to
forgo treatment. The court should then evaluate whether, as a matter of law, such
a treatment would impact self-identity and therefore clearly violate the plaintiff’s
cognitive liberty. If so, the court should decide as a matter of law that choosing
to forgo such a treatment was not unreasonable.
If the proposed treatment is not per se unreasonable, but instead a kind that
would enable an individual to facilitate self-healing without altering their core
identity, a court should then submit the issue to the jury to decide the
reasonableness of choosing to forgo the potential treatment,121 with instructions
about the definition, role, and relevance of cognitive liberty as an interest. Jurors
would be asked to balance the individual interests in cognitive liberty, and the
degree to which the mitigating treatment runs afoul of that interest, against the
societal interest of putting self-care in the hands of the plaintiff to lessen their
own suffering over time.

121

Much like the cases on conscientious objection to care, discussed infra Part II.C.iii.
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Under this approach, treatments that would erase the affective experience of
an event would be unreasonable as a matter of law.122 That a rape victim, a
witness or sufferer of trauma, or a combatant of war chooses to live with their
memories—both factual and emotional—should not be regarded as an
unreasonable choice if it best honors their experience and personality.
Embodying legal norms in tort law that would honor their preservation of
memory, rather than condemning them to erase and ignore their life experiences,
better reflects and celebrates the human condition. It is not unreasonable for
society to value personal choices when those choices reflect a critical aspect of
self-identity.
By contrast, some treatments that less clearly impact cognitive liberty—like
some ordinary forms of psychological counseling or “talk therapy”—should be
evaluated by the jury on a case-by-case basis to determine whether one ought
reasonably to submit to such treatments to address and ultimately alleviate their
own suffering. In these cases, in making its determination of reasonableness, the
jury would consider whether the proposed treatment negatively impacts
plaintiff’s interest in cognitive liberty, as well as the ordinary risks and benefits
of the proposed treatment.
Through this two-tiered approach, society (through its jurors) would begin
to demarcate the more nuanced contours of cognitive liberty by deciding on a
case-by-case basis whether treatments that are not clearly identity-changing (and
therefore unreasonable as a matter of law) may still negatively impact cognitive
liberty. Plaintiff would request a jury instruction that explicitly accounts for
cognitive liberty in such cases along the following lines:
If you find a health care provider advised the plaintiff to submit to an
operation or any other treatment, you would not necessarily conclude
that plaintiff acted unreasonably in declining such an operation or
treatment.
In determining whether the plaintiff’s conduct was reasonable, you
must consider all of the circumstances as they appeared to the plaintiff
at the time he chose not to follow the health care provider’s advice.
These may include:



The financial condition of the plaintiff
The degree of risk involved

122
Scholars have advanced compelling arguments about the economic value of applying the doctrine of
avoidable consequences to emotional distress injuries. But these economic values are insufficient to overcome
the implications for individuals and society as technology develops that society will condemn their choice to
leave their minds technologically unaltered.

FARAHANYPROOFS_10.28.19

2019]

10/29/2019 2:36 PM

THE COSTS OF CHANGING OUR MINDS









103

The amount of pain involved
The chances for success
The benefits to be obtained from the procedure
The availability of alternate procedures
Whether health care providers agree among themselves as to the
advisability of the procedure
The knowledge or lack of knowledge of the plaintiff
The plaintiff’s investigation into and beliefs about whether the
treatment would impact their interest in cognitive liberty

Cognitive liberty is the right to self-determination over our own brains
and mental experiences. It encompasses freedom of thought and
rumination, the right to self-access and self-alteration, and to consent
to or refuse changes to our brains and our mental experiences. Like all
individual interests, it is not absolute, but must be balanced against the
societal costs it introduces. You must decide if plaintiff reasonably
believed the treatment would negatively impact their cognitive liberty,
and if so, find that the plaintiff did not unreasonably decline such
treatment.

This approach enables society to grapple with both the straightforward and
the difficult cases for invoking cognitive liberty to respect the competing
personal and societal interests at stake.
An individual who unwittingly and irresponsibly leaves their emotional
well-being untreated, or who takes no responsibility for addressing their
emotional well-being ex ante, would still face a limitation on the award of their
emotional damages. And in the case of suffering a tortious wrongdoing ex post,
a plaintiff could evaluate the risks and benefits of treatments—such as
antidepressants, psychotherapy, or memory modification—and reasonably
decide, without risk of social condemnation, that such treatments would come at
too high of a cost to their personality, self-identity, and continuity of thought
and personal history.
It is precisely this type of reflective self-determination that has led some
courts to decide, as a matter of law, that plaintiff’s efforts at mitigation were not
unreasonable. But courts have given little coherence to the principles underlying
these choices. The ex post analysis should explicitly rely upon the right to
cognitive liberty as the reason that forgoing such identity-altering treatments is
not unreasonable. We should at the same time enable juries to help shape the
contours of cognitive liberty by deciding which treatments, while not clearly
identity-altering, are still the kind of treatments that run afoul of cognitive
liberty. To be clear, jurors would not and should not assess the reasonableness
of a plaintiff’s interest in cognitive liberty, but rather whether a plaintiff’s belief
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about a less clear identity-changing treatment impacted the plaintiff’s interest in
cognitive liberty. This step-wise approach will enable us, over time, to develop
a coherent body of tort law that is responsive both to novel developments in
science and our social understanding of cognitive liberty across law.
Tort law “reflects a judgment that the maintenance of one’s emotional wellbeing in the face of adversity is something for which a plaintiff ordinarily must
take responsibility.”123 Requiring individuals to have a certain degree of
fortitude and resilience in facing the possibilities of emotional insult in life is
different than expecting, after they have suffered from a cognizable injury, to
limit their recovery based on whether they choose to dampen their emotional
suffering that follows. A norm of self-reliance and emotional fortitude should
not encompass an expectation that individuals use novel scientific developments
to blunt themselves ex ante against emotional insults.124 And it most certainly
should not require that ex post individuals be labeled as unreasonable for
forgoing treatments that would alter their self-identity.
C. The Role of Cognitive Liberty Across Law
The current doctrine of mitigation of emotional distress injuries becomes
more intelligible when approached through the lens of cognitive liberty. When
the court in Dohman125 rejected electroshock therapy as a form of mitigation that
the plaintiff ought to have undergone, it did so because electroshock would have
“work[ed] a change in his personality.”126 Changes to personality are at odds
with cognitive liberty, and the court was implicitly recognizing the limits of the
doctrine in light of cognitive liberty. Electroshock therapy changes areas of the
brain that are essential to how people feel, learn, and respond to positive and
negative environmental factors.127 It does so by changing the structural integrity
and functional connectivity in the brain.128 While effective for some individuals
with severe depression, common side effects include some degree of both
transient and pervasive amnesia, and on very rare occasions heart attacks, stroke,

123

Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 8, at 1683.
If courts or scholars were to argue that even ex ante individuals have a duty to use modern neuroscience
to safeguard against emotional insults by blunting their reactions to those insults, then cognitive liberty would
be at issue ex ante as well.
125
See infra Part II.A.
126
Dohmann v. Richard, 282 So. 2d 789, 793 (La. Ct. App. 1973).
127
Shantanu H. Joshi et al., Structural Plasticity of the Hippocampus and Amygdala Induced by
Electroconvulsive Therapy in Major Depression, 79 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 282, 287 (2016).
128
Antoni Kubicki et al., Variations in Hippocampal White Matter Diffusivity Differentiate Response to
Electroconvulsive Therapy in Major Depression, 211 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY: COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE &
NEUROIMAGING 300, 301 (2019).
124
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and even death.129 Courts ought to follow the Dohman court’s approach, but do
so because electroshock therapy violates trauma victims’ cognitive liberty.
The seemingly puzzling distinction another court drew between in deciding
that a plaintiff reasonably mitigated his emotional distress by attending
psychological counseling but forgoing antidepressant medications130 also makes
sense through a lens of cognitive liberty. Antidepressant medications change the
neurochemistry underlying affective experiences, and commonly cause
emotional blunting in individuals. Psychological counseling, by contrast, is
usually geared toward enabling individuals to face and cope with their life
experiences rather than blunt or ablate them.
Even some inapposite cases where courts have found plaintiffs unreasonable
for failing to mitigate their emotional distress injuries become more coherent
through the two-tiered lens of cognitive liberty. Cases like EEOC v. Fred Meyer
Stores, Inc.,131 in which the plaintiff alleged that the defendant created a sexually
hostile work environment and had her damages reduced for failing to seek
psychological counseling, seemed odd at first. But it now makes sense where the
issue was the reasonableness of forgoing psychological counseling. Many, if not
most, forms of psychological counseling may alleviate suffering without
creating a discontinuity of self, and are therefore the kinds of treatment a judge
ought to submit to the jury to resolve. But a better outcome in these cases would
be to instruct the jury to also weigh the impact on cognitive liberty when
evaluating the risks and benefits of a forgone treatment.
Other cases would come out differently, such as when courts have submitted
to the jury to decide whether a plaintiff ought to have taken antidepressant
medications132 or submitted to electroshock therapy.133 Cognitive liberty would
enable courts to more easily distinguish between therapeutic treatments designed
to work a change in the personality, memory, or individual affect, versus
treatments that by design help individuals incorporate their experiences and
memories into their self-identity.
Looking beyond tort law, cognitive liberty may be implicitly lurking behind
other legal doctrines where making its presence known could enable greater
coherence and reasoning. Judicial deliberative privilege may be one such area.
129
Richard D. Weiner, Ethical Considerations with Electroconvulsive Therapy, 5 VIRTUAL MENTOR 352,
352 (2003).
130
See In re Air Crash Disaster at Charlotte, N.C. on July 2, 1994, 982 F. Supp. 1101, 1112 (D.S.C. 1997).
131
Alberini, supra note 2.
132
See Maynard v. Ferno-Washington, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1176 (E.D. Wash. 1998).
133
See Gottfried v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., No. 94 C 5249, 1995 WL 12478, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 1995).
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This seemingly obscure doctrine of evidentiary law has long been implicitly
recognized in law as securing to judges confidentiality for their judicial
communications and deliberations.134 The procedural safeguards that are in
place already grant life tenure to federal judges without the risk of capricious
removal from office, so the privilege cannot be understood merely as a safeguard
to separation of powers.135
In 2012, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court explicitly recognized an
absolute right to judicial deliberative privilege, finding it “deeply rooted in our
common-law and constitutional jurisprudence and in the precedents of the
United States Supreme Court and the courts of our sister States.”136 The absolute
privilege protects a “judge’s mental impressions and thought processes in
reaching a judicial decision, whether harbored internally or memorialized in
other nonpublic materials.”137 The court recognized an absolute but narrowly
tailored privilege that excludes “a judge’s memory of nondeliberative events in
connection with cases in which the judge participated,” and other biases or
external influences that are “outside the protected sphere of the judge’s internal
deliberations.”138 The privilege ensures the finality of judicial decision-making,
the quality and integrity of their decision-making, and the independence and
impartiality of the judiciary from other branches of government.139
Considering the privilege anew from the lens of cognitive liberty, the mental
thought processes of judges would also be protected. Cognitive liberty would
give the theoretical core one could draw upon to help resolve the growing divide
between courts concerning the contours of the privilege, including whether it is
absolute or qualified.140

134
Kevin C. Milne, Note, The Doctrine of Judicial Privilege: The Historical and Constitutional Basis
Supporting A Privilege for The Federal Judiciary, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 213, 213 (1987); see also Grant v.
Shalala, 989 F.2d 1332, 1344–45 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting the difficulty with being able to decide cases on the
evidence alone if thought processes are subject to scrutiny); Thomas v. Page, 837 N.E.2d 483, 490–91 (Ill. Ct.
App. 2005); In re Enforcement of Subpoena, 972 N.E.2d 1022, 1026 (Mass. 2012); In re Cohen’s Estate, 174
N.Y.S. 427, 428–29 (Sup. Ct. 1919); Leber v. Stretton, 928 A.2d 262, 270 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007); State ex rel.
Kaufman v. Zakaib, 535 S.E.2d 727, 735 (W. Va. 2000). In United States v. Morgan, the Court drew the analogy
between the decision-making process of the Secretary of Agriculture to that of a judge, stating that “[s]uch an
examination of a judge would be destructive of judicial responsibility.” 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941).
135
See Milne, supra note 134, at 214 n.7, 217–18.
136
In re Enforcement of Subpoena, 972 N.E.2d at 1026.
137
Id. at 1033.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 1028–31.
140
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, and the
Illinois Appellate Court find the privilege absolute but narrow. See id. at 1033; Thomas v. Page, 937 N.E.2d
483, 493 (Ill. Ct. App. 2005); State ex rel. Kaufman v. Zakaib, 535 S.E.2d 727, 736 (W. Va. 2000).
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Cognitive liberty, like other liberties, is not absolute but ought to be balanced
against other societal interests at stake. Deliberative privilege enables judges to
think freely, speak frankly, and withstand the pressure of public opinion in
rendering their decisions.141 If it is qualified, a party seeking to pierce the
privilege ought to have to show “the importance of the information sought and
the difficulty of obtaining it from other sources . . .”142 If the privilege is rooted
in cognitive liberty, the burden on a party seeking to pierce the privilege ought
to be quite high—but not unyielding. The privilege should be tailored143
consistent with its risks and benefits to society.
Cognitive liberty may also provide insights about the legitimacy of forcibly
medicating prisoners to restore their competency. The Louisiana Supreme Court
has found it unconstitutional to render a prisoner competent to be executed
because it violates their “privacy and personhood,” is an “unjustified invasion
of [] brain and body,” and “mind and thoughts.”144 The Eighth Circuit, by
contrast, believes that doing so serves the legitimate purposes of “prison security
or medical need,” and that it is even permissible to forcibly medicate a prisoner
who has a set execution date.145 In Sell v. United States, the United States
Supreme Court introduced a four-factor test for deciding if it is constitutional to
forcibly medicate a prisoner to restore their competency to stand trial.146 Courts
have applied the Sell factors for purposes of forcibly medicating a prisoner to be
sentenced as well.147
Forcibly medicating individuals runs afoul of cognitive liberty. Overriding
individual consent and one’s interest in self-determination is deeply troubling.
And yet, the analysis does not end there. This is a more difficult case because at
issue is restoring a person to competency which could be seen as restoring one’s
obscured identity and personality. As a first-blush analysis of this challenging

141

See Milne, supra note 134, at 232.
Harris v. Goins, No. 6: 15-151-DCR, 2016 WL 4501466, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 26, 2016).
143
See, e.g., State ex rel. Veskrna v. Steel, 894 N.W.2d 788, 803 (Neb. 2017) (finding the proper
constitutional balance between judicial privilege and workable government to require the privilege be absolute
but narrowly tailored).
144
State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 755 (La. 1992); see also Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53, 61 (S.C.
1993) (“We hold that the South Carolina Constitutional right of privacy would be violated if the State were to
sanction forced medication solely to facilitate execution.”).
145
Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1026–27 (8th Cir. 2003).
146
539 U.S. 166, 180–81 (2003) (holding that (1) a court must find important governmental interests at
stake; (2) the court must conclude that forcibly medicating a defendant significantly advances the interest of
ensuring a fair trial for a defendant; (3) the court must find that involuntarily medicating the defendant is
necessary to that interest and that less invasive treatments will not yield substantially similar results; (4) and that
it is medically appropriate to administer drugs).
147
United States v. Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 233, 240–41 (4th Cir. 2006).
142
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issue, I would posit that one’s interest in their own mental experiences and
personality will be weaker when one’s self-identity is already discontinuous due
to mental illness. The interests in safeguarding prison guards and other prisoners
from mentally ill inmates, or rendering an individual competent to assist in their
own defense, may in some instances outweigh a weakened but violated interest
in cognitive liberty. Notice, however, how bringing cognitive liberty into the
foray allows us to take the analysis one layer deeper and begin to address the
root concerns at issue.
Even our preference for silence-lovers over noisemakers in zoning law, the
alienability of the mind in copyright law, and whether individuals can be forced
to give passwords stored only in their minds will implicate cognitive liberty.
And how will we come to regard the testimony of a rape victim who alters her
memory through drugs or devices after giving her preserved testimony? Will her
preserved testimony violate the perpetrator’s rights to confront the witness under
the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment?148
We will gain new insights into how to resolve each of these existing riddles
in law through the lens of cognitive liberty. And we will bring greater coherence
across our many legal doctrines implicated by making explicit the interest in
cognitive liberty at stake. While these are subjects of future scholarship and case
law, already we can see that cognitive liberty implicitly undergirds so much of
our existing law. By making it explicit and defining its contours, many puzzling
doctrines can have a common sensibility.
In tort law, specifically, there is even more to learn from whether the doctrine
of avoidable consequences applies to emotional distress injuries: One ought not
face the cruel dilemma of choosing between suffering the emotional
consequences of a tortious wrongdoing or the emotional consequences of
changing one’s mind. Our legal norms ought to treat the unmitigated mind as
reasonable.
CONCLUSION
Advances in neuroscience and medicine now offer easier ways to mitigate
invisible injuries by making changes to one’s brain. These changes—whether to
brain chemistry, memories, or affect—impact our personalities, experiences,
and perceptions. But that we can change our brains in ways that reduce pain and
148
But see United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 562–64 (1988) (holding that the admission of a prior,
out-of-court identification statement of a witness who suffered memory loss and could not explain the basis of
the identification did not violate the Confrontation Clause).
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suffering does not necessarily mean that our legal norms and rules should reward
only those individuals who do so. Our ability to change our brains requires us to
contemplate the bounds of whether and, if so, when we should be permitted or
encouraged to do so. That inquiry requires us to decide and define the boundaries
of cognitive liberty and its implications for law, ranging from tort law to the
forcible competency of prisoners.
This Article offers a first step toward a systematic and thoroughgoing
account of those boundaries. It suggests that our legal regimes have until now
only dimly recognized an interest in cognitive liberty. And it offers a descriptive
and normative account of cognitive liberty, and why its explicit recognition
should impact judgments about whether a plaintiff has reasonably mitigated her
emotional distress injuries. It offers a two-tiered approach to doing so, with
treatments that clearly impact self-identity being per se reasonable for a plaintiff
to forgo, and with other less clear treatments being submitted to a jury to weigh
the treatment’s impact on cognitive liberty versus societal interests in decreasing
the costs of accidents.
Preserving individual and social memory are fundamental to freedom of
thought, to the right to self-access and self-alteration, and to the right to consent
to or refuse treatment. Combined, these interests are the interests in cognitive
liberty, a fundamental interest essential to individual and social flourishing.
Cognitive liberty has far broader implications for law. It may help us unravel
some of the most difficult conundrums in law, such as whether the government
or employers can require individuals or employees to provide their passwords to
social media accounts, which they store mentally but not in any other physical
medium. Cognitive liberty better explains doctrines like absolute judicial
deliberative privilege, which protects the deliberative process a judge uses in
decision-making from discovery by others. Cognitive liberty makes plain that
forcibly medicating prisoners who lack competency to stand trial may
sometimes occur in contexts where a prisoner’s cognitive liberty should trump
societal interests in bringing that individual to justice. And it introduces some of
the broader implications of memory modification—including the potential need
to reexamine our current understanding of what it means to confront a witness
under the Confrontation Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
While this Article leaves some of these difficult cases for future work to
resolve, by laying down the principles of cognitive liberty in this article and
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applying it to this first case—the doctrine of avoidable consequences in tort
law—it introduces the role of cognitive liberty in law and in our lives. And it
invites us to begin to understand its critical role in law as technology
fundamentally alters our relationship to our minds and, ultimately, ourselves.

